TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS: MOBILITY, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

KEY FINDINGS FROM 2014 AND SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS FROM TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS AND TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS: IMMIGRATION 2008-13
Transatlantic Trends 2014 Partners

From 2008 until 2011 Transatlantic Trends: Immigration also received generous support from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and Fundación BBVA.
Introduction

With more than 230 million people on the move worldwide, migrant-receiving societies such as the United States and Europe confront many similar immigration challenges — but they also experience the benefits that migrants can bring. U.S. and European policymakers alike need to determine admittance criteria for legal immigrants, decide between temporary and permanent labor migration programs, find solutions to reduce illegal immigration, and address the issue of integration. At the same time, policymakers must recognize that migration has important implications for domestic policy concerns, such as national security, economics, identity politics, and social cohesion.

Public opinion is crucial for policymakers in determining appropriate courses of action. GMF’s public opinion surveys Transatlantic Trends and Transatlantic Trends: Immigration have addressed immigration and integration policy issues in a systematic way, and compared them across the Atlantic and within Europe. They produced a wealth of interesting data: some questions show surprisingly stable trends in public opinion on immigration and integration despite changing political environments, while others showed that public opinion is nuanced and differentiated rather than polarized.

This report provides an overview of the 2014 key findings on mobility, migration, and integration from the Transatlantic Trends survey, as well as selected highlights of the years 2008-13 compiled through both surveys — Transatlantic Trends in 2013 and Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (2008-11). Transatlantic Trends is a project of the German Marshall Fund (GMF) and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Barrow Cadbury Trust, the BBVA Foundation, and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For questions pertaining to migration and integration, the advisory committee included Susan Martin, executive director, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University; Claudia Diehl, professor of microsociology, University of Konstanz; Pierangelo Isernia, professor of political science, University of Siena; Ayesha Saran, programme manager, and Debbie Pippard, head of programmes, from the Barrow Cadbury Trust (U.K.); and Nicoló Russo Perez, program manager, Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy).

Astrid Ziebarth, director of GMF’s Migration and Society Program, Tanja Wunderlich, senior transatlantic fellow, and Josh Raisher, program coordinator for Transatlantic Trends, wrote this special report and shaped the migration section of the Transatlantic Trends Key Findings report. The authors of the Transatlantic Trends 2014 Key Findings Report were Constanze Stelzenmüller, senior transatlantic fellow and project lead for Transatlantic Trends, and Josh Raisher. We wish to acknowledge the invaluable help of Linda Basile, postdoctoral researcher at the University of Siena. Daniela Braun and Bridget Parker played a major role in creating the accompanying charts and provided other essential help during the preparation of this report.

Notes on Terminology: In this survey we used the term “illegal immigrant,” as opposed to “irregular” or “undocumented” migrant, to describe foreign citizens who enter, stay, and/or work in the country without the permission of the national government.
In this section, we describe the methodology used for Transatlantic Trends 2014. For methodologies and countries polled from 2008 to 2013, please refer to the methodology sections of those reports, available at transatlantictrends.org.

TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Poland, Russia, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews.

In all countries but Russia, a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, was interviewed; in Russia the sample size was 1,500. Interviews were conducted primarily between June 2 and June 25, 2014.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

For trended questions first asked before 2010, averages were weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country to maintain consistency with previous years’ reports. For questions that started in 2010 or later, the results were also weighted so that the sample matches certain population characteristics, including age, gender, education, and region.

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR), the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut, and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and are available to scholars and other interested parties.

For more detailed methodology and topline data, please visit www.transatlantictrends.org.

**Note on European Averages**

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition of new countries has affected the Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we have treated several different averages as if they were part of one average. When the EU average is reported for previous years, this is based on the EU-7 average from 2002-03, the EU-8 average from 2004-10, the EU-9 average from 2011-13, and the EU-10 average for 2014.

**European Averages Reported**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU7</th>
<th>2002-03</th>
<th>U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, and Portugal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU8</td>
<td>2004-10</td>
<td>EU7 countries plus Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU9</td>
<td>2011-13</td>
<td>EU8 countries plus Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU10</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>EU9 countries plus Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>TOTAL COVERAGE</td>
<td>EUROPEAN COVERAGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>U.S. + E6</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>U.S. + E7</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>U.S. + E10</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal, Turkey, Slovakia, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>U.S. + E12</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal, Turkey, Slovakia, Spain, Bulgaria, Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>U.S. + E13</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal, Turkey, Slovakia, Spain, Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>U.S. + E13 + Russia</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal, Turkey, Slovakia, Spain, Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>U.S. + E12</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal, Turkey, Slovakia, Spain, Romania, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>U.S. + E11 + Russia</td>
<td>France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal, Turkey, Spain, Sweden</td>
</tr>
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In 2014, the topics of mobility, migration, and integration continue to be intertwined with foreign policy challenges and economic hardship. Conflicts in Syria and other parts of the world continue to force people to flee to safer neighboring countries, while asylum and refugee matters carry a great deal of weight within the European Union, with an increase of border crossings in the Mediterranean Sea pushing Southern European countries to ask for more support and burden sharing among EU member states. At the same time, economic pressures also remain a main driver of mobility within the European Union, intensifying discussions on integration and access to benefits in countries that receive migration and the impacts of emigration on the countries from which migrants are relocating.

In the United States, the debate about immigration reform and how to proceed with the 11-12 million unauthorized immigrants remains difficult for policymakers. The last two years have also seen an unprecedented rise of unaccompanied minors from Central America, adding to the pressure to act on migration policy.

**Most Europeans and Americans Have Immigrant Friends**

Majorities in both the United States (69%) and Europe (58%) said that they had at least a few friends who were born in other countries; 30% of Americans and 41% of Europeans said that they did not. Swedes were the most likely to say that “many” of their friends were born abroad (21%), and also the most likely to say “a few” were (63%); German (66%), Spanish (64%), French (63%), Greek (59%), and British (58%) respondents were also particularly likely to count immigrants among their friends. Poland was the only country in the EU where a majority of respondents said that they did not have friends born abroad (70%).

In Turkey, 68% said that none of their friends were born abroad, while 21% said a few were.

**Large Majorities in the United States and EU Disapprove of their Governments’ Handling of Immigration**

*Transatlantic Trends* asked respondents whether they approved of their own government’s handling of immigration from other countries. Sixty percent of Europeans said they disapproved; 71% of Americans polled disapproved as well. Disapproval in Europe was most pronounced in Spain (77%), Greece (75%), the United Kingdom (73%), Italy, and France (both 64%). In Turkey, 67% disapproved. Majorities approved in Sweden (60%) and Poland (50%).

These results are similar to those obtained in 2013 when respondents were asked if their governments were “doing a good job” managing immigration policy: 58% of Europeans said no, as did 68% of Americans. Seventy-four percent of Spanish respondents said their government was not doing a good job, as did 72% of British respondents.

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1 The 2008-11 data reported in this section was collected in a separate survey, *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* (TTI). Some TTI trend questions were used in this section. Comparability of the 2014 and 2013 data with those previous data sets is limited, however, because of a potential framing effect due to the fact that immigration questions were here preceded by questions about foreign, security, and economic policy.

2 Question D 15: Do you have any friends who were born in another country who now live in [COUNTRY]?

3 Question 3.3: Do you approve or disapprove of the way [COUNTRY’S] government is handling immigration from other countries?
Sixty-four percent of Swedish respondents said the government was doing a poor job, rendering this year’s result a significant reversal; the same could be said of Poland, where 49% said their government was doing a poor job in 2013.

In Germany, 46% of respondents approved of the government’s handling of immigration in 2014, a near-return to 2011 levels (38%) after a jump to 54% in 2013. Fifty-one percent of respondents disapproved of the government’s handling of immigration.

**Large Transatlantic Majorities Agree Most Immigrants Come to their Countries to Work**

In a new question, *Transatlantic Trends* asked respondents to name what they thought were the two most common reasons for immigrants to come to their country. Answers varied widely from one country to another.4

“To work” was selected as either the first or second most common reason by nearly two-in-three respondents in Europe (61%), and by three-in-four in the United States (70%). This reason was most often named in Spain (74%), followed by Greece (72%) and Poland (67%).

“To seek social benefits” was the next most frequent cited reason, by 41% in Europe, and by 45% in the United States. This motivation was most often named in the Netherlands (56%)

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4 Question 26a+b: In your opinion, what do you think is the most common reason for immigrants (from other countries) to come to [COUNTRY]? And what is the second most common reason?

Country percentages for this question add up to 200%, because the question allowed two responses.
Chart 2: Why Immigrants Come to Country

Results represent the primary response given.

Q26a
and France (54%). In the United Kingdom, 55% of respondents said “access to social benefits,” a slightly different wording drafted to better address the discussion there.

“To seek asylum” was the third most frequent motivation attributed to immigrants in Europe (40%), but only 18% of Americans agreed. This reason was most often named in Sweden (68%), followed by Germany and the Netherlands (both 47%), as well as Italy (46%).

“To be united with family members” was quoted fourth, with 22% in Europe and 30% in the United States. It was most often referenced in Sweden (46%) followed by France (31%).

“To study” was quoted in fourth place by Americans (23%), and in fifth or last place by the Europeans (18%); it was named most frequently in Portugal (34%), the United Kingdom (32%), and Poland (27%).

In Turkey, an overwhelming majority (77%) felt immigrants came most often to seek asylum; 47% thought immigrants came to seek social benefits, and 35% said they came to work.

**Opinion Divided on Policies Toward Refugees**

*Transatlantic Trends* asked for the first time about the policies toward refugees in respondents’ countries. In Europe, a plurality (40%) said their country’s policy should be more restrictive, whereas only 34% said policies were “about right now.” Results in the United States were similar; a plurality (34%) agreed with the proposition that current policies are “about right now,” while 38% felt they should be more restrictive. Minorities in Europe (21%) and the United States (20%) felt their countries’ treatment of refugees should be less restrictive.\(^5\)

Among the respondents most in favor of more restrictive refugee policies, Italy (57%) and Greece (56%) stood out, followed by the United Kingdom (48%). Respondents in Poland (42%), France, and Sweden (both 40%) were most likely to agree that their own country’s policy was about right. The highest percentage of respondents willing to have less restrictive refugee policies was found in Germany (31%), followed by the Netherlands (26%), Poland, and Spain (both 24%).

Two-in-three Turks (66%) favored more restrictive refugee policies; 21% thought they should be less restrictive, and only 10% thought they were about right. Seventy-seven percent of Turkish respondents said they were worried about refugees; 20% said they were not worried.

**Europeans more Worried about Immigration from Outside the EU than about Mobility Within the EU**

*Transatlantic Trends* asked for the first time whether Europeans were worried about immigration from within or from outside the EU. Fifty-five percent of European respondents said they were not worried about immigration from within the EU, while 43% were; 56%, however, said they were worried about immigration from outside the EU, while 42% were not.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Question 28: And how about refugees? Do you think that [COUNTRY’S] policies toward refugees should be more restrictive/should be less restrictive/are about right now?

Question 29.5 (only in Turkey): Can you tell me if you are worried or not worried about refugees?

\(^6\) Question 29.3, 4: Can you tell me if you are worried or not worried about immigration from within/from outside the EU?
Information Changes Perceptions of Immigration

In 2014, Transatlantic Trends repeated an experiment from TTI 2010 in order to see how respondents’ perceptions of the number of immigrants differ if they are made aware of actual immigration statistics. For this question, one-half of each national sample received official Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates of immigrants as a percentage of a country’s population, and the other half did not.¹

The results support the outcome of 2010: information does change perceptions about the number of immigrants. Those who heard an official estimate before answering the question were less likely, especially in Greece and the United Kingdom, to say there were “too many” immigrants in their country: without information 58% of Greek respondents said there were too many immigrants in the country, while only 27% of those who received information said the same. In the U.K., the percentage dropped from 54% down to 31%; in Italy it dropped from 44% to 22%, while the number of those saying “not many” increased from 15% to 34%.

Overall, in both Europe and the United States more than one-third of those who did not receive the official statistics thought there were too many immigrants in their country (Europe 32%, United States 38%). These numbers are in stark contrast to those who did receive the statistics beforehand: only one-in-five in Europe and the United States (both 21%) thought there were “too many,” representing an 11 percentage point decrease in the former and a 17 percentage point decrease in the latter.

1 Question 27b: Generally speaking, how do you feel about the number of people living in [COUNTRY] who were not born in [COUNTRY]?  Question 27a: As you may know, according to official estimates, around [XX]% of the [COUNTRY] population was born in another country. In your opinion, is this too many, a lot but not too many, or not many?
Respondents in Sweden (82%) were most likely to say they were not concerned by immigration *within* the EU, followed by Poland (72%), and Germany (65%). Those most worried about immigration within the EU were respondents in Portugal (62%), followed by Spain (53%), Italy, and the United Kingdom (both 51%).

Respondents in Greece (84%) were most likely to say that they were concerned by immigration *from outside* the EU, followed by Italy (76%) and France (59%). The leader in the group that was least concerned by immigration from outside the EU was Sweden (69%), followed by Poland (57%).

**Majority in United States Says First-Generation Immigrants are Integrating Well, But Europe is Divided**

Publics in Europe and the United States were mostly optimistic about the integration of immigrants, particularly about the second generation. A majority of respondents in the United States (51%, down ten percentage points from 2013) stated that they felt that first-generation immigrants were integrating well into U.S. society. Europe was split, with 46% saying first-generation immigrants were integrating well, and 48% saying they were not. Majorities saw first-generation immigrants as integrating well in Portugal (83%), followed by Spain (59%), Poland (54%), and the United Kingdom (46%).

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7 Question 32a: Generally speaking, how well do you think that immigrants are integrating into NATIONALITY society?
However, majorities in Greece (70%), Sweden (65%, up 4 percentage points since 2013), France (56%, up 3 percentage points since 2013), Italy (52%, up 17 percentage points since 2013), and Germany (51%, up 3 percentage points since 2013) disagreed, as did half of respondents in the United Kingdom and Netherlands (both 50%), saying immigrants were integrating poorly.

In Turkey, 66% of respondents (down eight percentage points since 2013) stated that first-generation immigrants were integrating poorly. Thirty-two percent disagreed, up 19 percentage points since 2013.

Transatlantic Majorities Say Children of Immigrants are Integrating Well

When respondents were asked about second-generation immigrants, answers were much more positive. Sixty-nine percent (up one percentage point since 2013) of Americans thought they were integrating well, with 61% (up two percentage points since 2013) of Europeans concurring. Approval was highest in Portugal (86%, up four percentage points since 2013), Greece (70%), Spain (69%, down four percentage points from 2013), the Netherlands (66%, up five percentage points since 2013), as well as in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom (all 63%).

Among those who said that immigrants’ children are integrating poorly, disapproval stood out in France (48%, down seven percentage points since 2013), and Sweden (41%, down two percentage points since 2013).

Fifty-four percent (down two percentage points since 2013) of Turkish respondents thought that second-generation immigrants were integrating poorly; 42% (up nine percentage points since 2013) thought they were doing well.

Americans Say Emigration is not a Problem; Europeans Disagree, Some Strongly

Asked whether emigration was a problem for their country, more than two-in-three U.S. respondents (66%, compared to 69% in 2013) said it was not, whereas 58% of Europeans said it was (57% in 2013). The highest agreement levels in Europe were found in Greece (95%), Portugal (93%, up five percentage points from 2013), Spain (87%, up seven percentage points from 2013), Italy (84%, up two percentage points from 2013) and Poland (83%, up one percentage point from 2013). Respondents in the Netherlands (13%) and Sweden (15%) were least likely to say that emigration was a problem for their country.

In Turkey, there was a marked upswing in the number of respondents who saw emigration as a problem (75%, up 29 percentage points from 2013); 21% disagreed (down 24 percentage points since 2013).

8 Question 32b: Generally speaking, how well do you think that the children of immigrants are integrating into NATIONALITY society?
9 Question 33: Do you think that emigration in [COUNTRY], that is, the number of [NATIONALITY] who are leaving to live in other countries, is a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not a serious problem, or not a problem at all for [COUNTRY]? Question D18a,b: Have you ever thought about moving away from your home country for a year or more or even permanently? In view of the economic crisis, have you ever thought about moving away from your home country for a year or more or even permanently?
When asked if they would ever consider personally moving abroad, 68% of Americans said they had never thought about it, as did 51% of Europeans. Portuguese, Greek, and British respondents were the most likely to say they had done it or considered it (58%, 55%, and 55%, respectively); within Europe, Polish respondents were the most likely to want to stay put (59%). Seventy-two percent of Turks said that they had never thought about it.

When asked if they would emigrate in the context of the economic crisis, 68% of Americans and 63% of Europeans said they had never considered it.
Americans Worry about Illegal Immigrants, but Most Would Like to See Them Get Legal Status

In the United States, a fierce debate about immigration reform continues, centering now on how to proceed with the 11-12 million people who came to the country without legal documentation. The primary question is whether to legalize them or not, and whether to offer a pathway to citizenship if they are legalized.¹

When asked about illegal immigrants, 60% (compared to 61% in 2013) said they were worried; 38% (compared to 37% in 2013) said they were not worried. Seventy-eight percent (up five percentage points since 2013) of U.S. respondents said they were not worried about legal immigrants; 21% (down four percentage points since 2013) were worried.

Transatlantic Trends also asked Americans whether illegal immigrants should be required to return to their country of origin or should be given the opportunity to obtain legal status that allows them to stay in the United States. A plurality (45%) said illegal immigrants should be able to obtain legal status in the United States; 27% felt they should be required to return. Twenty-six percent said it depended on the circumstances. Of those Americans who support legalization, 86% agreed that the legal status should include a path to U.S. citizenship. Only 11% of those disagreed.

¹ Question 29.1, 2: Can you tell me if you are worried or not worried about legal/illegal immigration?; Question 30: Thinking now about immigrants who are currently living in [COUNTRY] ILLEGALLY, should they be required to return to their country of origin, or should they be given the opportunity to obtain legal status that allows them to stay here?; and FILTERED Question 31: You said that you would prefer for immigrants in the country illegally to have the opportunity to obtain legal status. In your opinion, should this legal status include a path to U.S. citizenship or should it not include a path to U.S. citizenship?
The following sections present some of the most interesting and striking findings of the data collected by GMF’s public opinion surveys Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (2008-11) and Transatlantic Trends (2013). Over that period, a number of worldwide events directly or indirectly affected national immigration policies and public opinion on immigration and integration, including the global economic crisis, international refugee movements in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, national controversies on immigration legislation, and the rise of populist parties in Europe. The data presented will therefore be contextualized with some background information on the public debate on immigration and integration in selected countries.

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS

Germans Beginning to See Immigration as Less of a Problem, as the French Grow More Worried

Since its first year in 2008, Transatlantic Trends: Immigration has asked respondents about their most fundamental feelings about immigration. Is immigration more of a problem? Or more of an opportunity?

The French have increasingly come to see immigration as a problem. While only 39% described immigration as a problem in 2008, that number has since been trending steadily upwards: 43% described immigration as more of a problem in 2009, 42% in 2010, and 46% in 2011. A full half of the sample — 50% — described immigration as a problem in 2013. Polish
Transatlantic Trends: Mobility, Migration, and Integration

For as long as Transatlantic Trends has been asking the question, Germany’s reaction to migration has been mixed. Even as the German government begins actively courting labor migrants to maintain the momentum of the national economy, integration of migrant communities and the reduction of discrimination and racism in the wider German public continues to pose a challenge.

The German government amended formerly restrictive laws such as the Labor Migration Control Act in recent years, making it much easier for companies to hire abroad — even for lower-skilled professions. It also initiated official platforms such as the “Make it in Germany” portal to get potential migrants interested in coming to and working in Germany. Alongside the implementation of the EU Blue Card for Highly Skilled in 2012, Germany — together with Sweden — is now among the OECD countries with the most open migration policies in Europe. In 2013, increased immigration was framed as a mostly positive development, with the ability to offset demographic decline and make up for labor shortages.

At the same time, Germany continues to struggle to weave newcomers into the country’s social, political, and judicial fabric and address growing religious diversity. The German government has started to regularly convene important integration stakeholders at the German Integration Summit and the German Islam Conference (both held since 2006). These conferences are platforms for exchange, intended to contribute to a more pragmatic and progressive debate on integration and Islam in Germany.

None of this has completely erased a persistent social discomfort, however, embodied in a controversial book published in 2010 by Thilo Sarrazin, a member of the Social Democratic Party, entitled Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany Does Away With Itself). The book sold over 1 million copies, and sparked an emotional — and sometimes inflammatory — public debate.

respondents seem to be following the same pattern; 32% described immigration as a problem in 2008, while 42% described immigration as a problem when the country was next surveyed in 2013. The number describing it as an opportunity dropped simultaneously, from 34% to 24%.

Slovakia, polled for the first time in 2013, seemed to agree: 52% of Slovaks described immigration as more of a problem, compared to 16% who described it as more of an opportunity. Meanwhile, a consistent majority of British respondents have described immigration as a problem since the beginning of the survey — 64% in 2013, 68% in 2011, 65% in 2010, 66% in 2009, and 61% in 2008.

On the other hand, Germany and Spain may be shifting in the other direction. Fifty-two percent of Germans described immigration as more of an opportunity in 2008, as did 48% in 2009, 50% in 2010, and 50% in 2011. But a full 62% described immigration as an opportunity in 2013, a 12 percentage point jump, while only 32% described it as more of a problem. Spaniards were evenly split. Forty-four percent described immigration as a problem and 44% described it as an opportunity, but this represents a 14 percentage point drop from 2011 in respondents describing immigration as a problem, and a 12 percentage point gain in respondents describing immigration as an opportunity.
In other countries, the only pattern discernable among responses is a consistent ambivalence. Forty-seven percent of Americans described immigration as more of a problem in 2013, representing a decline from a high of 54% in 2009, while 46% described it as more of an opportunity, up from a low of 39% in 2011. Forty-six percent of Italians described immigration as more of a problem in 2013, while 32% described it as an opportunity. The Dutch were almost evenly divided, with 41% calling it a problem and 46% an opportunity. And in Portugal, 41% called immigration a problem, while 50% called it an opportunity.

Only in Sweden, the country least affected by the economic crisis, was immigration seen as a nearly unalloyed good. Sixty-eight percent described immigration as more of an opportunity in 2013, while only 22% said it was more of a problem.

Publics on Both Sides of the Atlantic Overestimate Immigrant Numbers

Estimates of the size of immigrant populations present a valuable indication of the public perception of immigration. In 2013, respondents were asked to estimate, on a scale of 0 to 100, the percentage of the population in their country that was born abroad. As in previous years when this question was asked, the public overestimated the percentage of immigrants in their countries by wide margins. On average, U.S. respondents guessed the share of immigrants in their country to be 42.1%; in fact, only 13% of the U.S. population is foreign-born. Portuguese respondents said 34.6% of their country’s residents were immigrants (actual number: 8.3%). The Swedes were closest to reality when they estimated their population to be 18.3% foreign-born (actual number: 15.1%).

When People Worry about Immigration, they Worry about Illegal Immigration, and about Muslim Immigrants

From the beginning, the survey has tried to gauge how much public perception of immigration and immigrants is influenced by the origins and identities of immigrant communities, asking respondents which immigrants they were most worried about and which worried them least. The results speak to some of the fears underlying the immigration debate.

Respondents have remained consistently more worried about illegal immigration. Sixty-one percent of Americans said they were worried about illegal immigration in 2013, compared to 25% worried about legal immigration; going back, 58% worried about illegal immigration in 2011, as did 58% in 2010, 61% in 2009, and 57% in 2008. While a few European countries expressed less concern in the past — 42% of French respondents said they were not worried about illegal immigration in 2009, for example, as did 41% of Dutch respondents and 41% of German respondents in 2011 — as of 2013 there was a transatlantic consensus. Eighty-eight percent of Portuguese respondents said they were worried about illegal immigration, as did 86% of Italian respondents, 80% of British respondents, and 74% of Spanish respondents.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the countries where people were the most worried about illegal immigration were often the same countries in which respondents were most likely to believe that the majority of immigration to their country was illegal. In Italy, 66% of respondents said that
most immigrants came to the country illegally in 2009, as did 55% of Spanish respondents and 51% of Americans.

Seventy-three percent of Americans and 69% of Europeans said they were not worried about legal immigration in 2013. Turkey was the only exception: thinking perhaps of the growing Syrian refugee crisis, 60% of Turks said they were worried about legal immigration.

Respondents were also wary of Muslim immigrants. When asked in 2010 if Muslims were integrating well, 45% in the United States said that they were — and only 33% in Europe agreed, with 58% saying they were not. In Spain, 70% said that they were integrating poorly, and in Germany 67% agreed. This is in stark contrast to the results when the same question is asked of immigrants in general: 59% in the United States said that immigrants are generally integrating well, as did 42% in Europe. The differences were particularly stark in Spain, where 54% said immigrants were integrating well (compared to 21% who said the same of Muslims); Germany, where 41% said immigrants were integrating well (compared to 25% who said the same of Muslims); and Canada, where 65% said immigrants were integrating well (compared to 45% for Muslims).

**Immigration Seen as Enriching, Except in the U.K.**

In 2009, Transatlantic Trends: Immigration started to ask respondents in Europe and the United States whether they thought that immigration enriches national culture with new customs and ideas or negatively affects national culture. Majorities in all countries except the
U.K.: Debating the Reduction of Net Migration

In the British public debate, immigration continues to be a dominant topic. In fact, the U.K. is the only country in Transatlantic Trends 2014 where a sizeable portion of respondents (25%) rank immigration as the most or second most important topic for the country; the only other country where it ranks as a significant concern is Germany, where 11% said it was the most important issue facing the nation.

The debate in the U.K. centers around the reduction of net migration, a political goal set by Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative Party. The plausibility of this goal is fiercely debated, as well as the economic costs that it would entail for employers and universities who are partially dependent on international migration and international students.

The aim of the Conservative Party is to reduce net migration, the difference between immigration and emigration flows, to below 100,000 by general elections in May 2015. Measures that have been introduced to attain that goal have included changes to labor migration policies such as declining entry to non-EU high-skilled migrants without job offers, and introducing a cap on skilled labor from outside the EU. However, with free movement within the EU, the U.K. has seen rising numbers of migrants again, especially from crisis-ridden Southern European countries. The government has announced new measures this July aimed at reducing abuse of the migration and the social benefit system, proclaiming that the prospect of receiving social benefits might otherwise encourage migrants to come to the U.K. in the first place.

The British government seems far away from its stated numerical net migration goal, with the Office of National Statistics saying that 526,000 people immigrated to the U.K. in 2013 while 314,000 emigrated — leaving net migration at 212,000 for 2013.

U.K. saw immigration as culturally enriching, with 58% of Europeans and 65% of Americans agreeing. Only 44% of the public in the U.K. saw immigration as culturally enriching, with 47% emphasizing its negative effect on culture. The trend for majorities in Europe and the United States to see immigration as enriching overall and for the U.K. to remain split remained in 2010 and 2011. In 2013, Transatlantic Trends asked a slightly modified question, whether “immigrants enrich our culture,” and two-thirds majorities in the United States (69%) and Europe (60%) said that they do. Agreement was highest in Sweden (82%), Germany (71%), Portugal (68%), the Netherlands, and Spain (both 66%). Interestingly, majorities in the U.K. (63%) also agreed with the sentiment when asked this way.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND POLICY OPTIONS

The Public has Mixed Views on how Governments Manage Immigration

From its second year on, Transatlantic Trends: Immigration asked how the public thought their governments were handling immigration and whether they were doing a fair or poor job. The responses varied significantly by country; some countries were consistently skeptical, while others showed significant shifts in the course of time toward more positive or negative assessments.

The U.K. has been one of the countries with a consistently skeptical view on how its government handles immigration despite changing governments and shifts in policies. In 2009, a
large majority (71%) thought that their government was doing a poor or very poor job in managing migration. British public opinion hardly changed over the following years — 70% said the government was doing a poor job in 2010, as did 74% in 2011 and 72% in 2013. In order to gauge whether these poor ratings were due to general government disapproval, respondents were also asked to rate how their governments were doing more generally. Major differences emerged between the two responses: while 45% in 2010 and 62% in 2011 disapproved of their government in general, a full 70% in 2010 and 74% in 2011 disapproved of the government’s immigration management.

A similar — albeit slightly less dramatic — picture was revealed in the United States, where respondents also assessed their government’s work on immigration policy skeptically. In 2009, a majority (63%) believed that their government was doing a poor or very poor job managing migration, with over one-quarter (29%) indicating that the government was doing a very poor job. In 2010 and 2011, a full 73% of respondents thought the government was doing a poor or very poor job managing migration, and in 2013 68% Americans said the same.

In contrast, Germany started off as an outlier in 2009, with 71% believing that the government was doing a good or fair job in managing immigration — by far the most positive assessment of all countries surveyed. In 2010, this number dropped significantly, with only 37% assessing the German government’s work on immigration positively and a majority (57%) having a negative view. The approval rate remained low in 2011. In 2013, the trend reversed again. A majority of respondents (54%, up 16 percentage points since 2011) approved of the German government’s immigration policy. While a causal relation cannot be established, it is noteworthy that the German government passed several new laws in 2012 and 2013 opening up the German labor market to immigrants. The general public debate about immigration in that time has largely related to a need for increased migration to offset the shrinking population and to fill shortages in the labor market to keep Germany competitive — a far cry from 2010, when Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel talked about the “failure of multiculturalism.”

Only Canadians Approve of Governments’ Handling of Integration

The public was also skeptical when asked about how their government handled integration, asked as a one-time question in Transatlantic Trends: Immigration in 2010. Overall, respondents in Europe and the United States felt that their governments were doing a poor or a very poor job at integrating immigrants into national society. Sixty percent of Europeans, on average, and 62% of Americans gave their governments bad marks. The Dutch were the most dissatisfied, with 78% claiming that the government was doing a poor job at integration. Canadians, on the other hand, were again outliers. Fifty-one percent of them said that the Canadian government was doing either a good or very good job at integrating New Canadians.

Though general government approval in Germany and Spain was very low — only 31% and 29%, respectively, thought that their government had been doing a good job over the preceding six months — on integration 38% of German respondents and 43% of Spanish respondents thought their government was doing a good job, a difference of 7 and 14 percentage points, respectively. In the U.K., conversely, respondents were 19 percentage points
more likely to say that the government was doing a good job in general (48%) than on integrating migrants (29%).

**Should Legal Immigrants be Given the Same Rights to Political Participation and Social Benefits as National Citizens?**

Majorities in Europe and the United States supported guaranteeing that legal immigrants should “have the same rights to political participation as the country’s citizens” (58% in Europe and 59% in the United States) when asked in *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* in 2008. Germans, however, were split, with 48% supporting and 50% opposing the idea. A close look at the U.S. opposition (37% overall) to granting political participation to immigrants revealed that over one-quarter, or 27%, “strongly oppose” the notion. Nearly the same can be said for the U.K., where the notion found overall support even as 22% of the British public said they “strongly oppose” it.

A similar pattern emerged in the United States and the U.K. when respondents were asked whether immigrants should have access to the same social benefits as national citizens. While European and U.S. public opinion again supported this idea (73% in Europe and 63% in the United States), the portion of Americans who opposed it (34%) included a high number of “strongly oppose” responses (24%). The same pattern held true for the U.K., where 57% supported access to the same social benefits as national citizens, but 26% said they “strongly oppose” this notion. Elsewhere in Europe, the highest support overall for granting social benefits was found in Italy (90%), the Netherlands (83%), and France (81%).
Publics Support Policies to Reduce Illegal Immigration

Managing illegal immigration is a hotly debated issue in the public discourse, and the survey’s results showed that people want their governments to do something about it — whatever that may be. When asked about various measures to reduce illegal immigration, respondents in all countries surveyed strongly supported every measure proposed: In both the United States and Europe, large numbers favored reinforcing border controls (83% and 80%, respectively), imposing tougher penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants (74% and 84%), and sending illegal immigrants back to their countries of origin (69% and 70%). At the same time, though, publics favored proactive policies, such as making it easier for immigrants to legally enter the country to work and study (61% in the United States and 70% in Europe).

To gauge whether people think these policies to reduce illegal immigration are effective or not, a follow-up question was asked in 2009. Respondents were asked which of four measures — increasing development aid to poor countries, reinforcing national border controls, imposing tougher penalties on employers of illegal immigrants, and making it easier for immigrants to enter legally to work and study — would be most effective at reducing illegal immigration. The answers to this question varied greatly by region. Countries bordering the Mediterranean had large pluralities or a slight majority — France (44%), Italy (45%), and Spain (51%) — who thought that increasing development aid would be the most effective. The U.K. was the country that most favored reinforcing border controls, with a plurality (44%) viewing this policy as the most effective. In northern continental Europe, 37% percent of Germans and 35% of the Dutch would prefer to impose employer sanctions. Respondents in the United States and Canada were more evenly split among border controls, employer sanctions, and increased avenues for legal migration.

The data in 2011 showed that Europeans saw much more value in development aid than did Americans. Thirty-two percent of Europeans chose this as the most effective policy tool to reduce illegal immigration, compared to only 11% of U.S. respondents. There was particularly high support for this tool in the Mediterranean countries: Italy (44%), France (42%), and Spain (41%). U.S. and British respondents preferred instead to reinforce border controls (31% and 44%, respectively), or impose tougher penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants (34% and 31%).

Support for Burden-Sharing in Europe

Strong majorities in all countries polled in Europe in 2011 supported burden-sharing in light of the North African crisis or Arab Spring, with 80% of respondents agreeing that responsibility should be shared by all countries in the European Union rather than borne solely by the country where migrants first arrive. Lowest support was expressed in the U.K. (68%), and highest support in Italy (88%), followed by Spain (85%). In those countries closest to the migrant source countries and bearing the brunt of flows, the public expressed the greatest interest in receiving support from other countries in the region. This diversity speaks directly to the contrasting perspectives on migration issues experienced in different parts of the European continent, and the continuing challenges of cooperation and harmonization of practices.
The Refugee Crisis in the Wake of the Arab Spring

The so-called Arab Spring, which began in earnest in late 2010 and early 2011, complicated the European migration picture. While many in the Middle East fled to neighboring countries to escape unrest, with Libyans heading to Egypt and Tunisia and Syrians to Turkey, there were also those who crossed the Mediterranean into the EU. As a consequence, the EU has stepped up controls of its external borders.

However, stronger fences and higher walls have forced irregular migrants to take more dangerous routes, and now more and more migrants have been entering the EU by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, a dangerous undertaking. The Italian island of Lampedusa has been hit particularly hard by the recent influx: the International Organization for Migration reported a total of more than 52,000 irregular migrants arriving on the island in 2011, with 1,630 in one night in March alone. An additional 1,500 died making the journey.

In response, the Italian government launched “Operation Mare Nostrum” in October 2013. The search and rescue initiative undertaken by the Italian navy to save endangered would-be migrants at sea represents a significant shift in Italian migration policy. Italian border agencies and military authorities, once prohibited from assisting migrants in danger, are now required to do so.

The situation in Lampedusa — and in other parts of southern Italy — has exacerbated a growing tension within the European Union between first receiver countries who are obliged by the so-called Dublin Regulation to first handle asylum claims, and those further within the EU’s borders. Italy has complained about a lack of European burden-sharing when tackling the flow of migrants, and disagreement within Europe about the degree to which migrant, and refugee responsibility should be shared has spilled over into a debate about free movement within the EU.

Growing Support for EU Decision-Making

In 2011, European respondents were asked about the appropriate role for EU involvement in general immigration considerations — specifically whether the European Union or national governments should decide how many immigrants should be accepted into each EU member state. Though support was lower than for North African crisis burden-sharing, there was still some support for a strong EU role in setting national immigration admissions numbers, with an average of 42% approval among European respondents.

The European average still does not indicate majority support, but support for European decision-making on immigration numbers increased in all countries polled compared to 2010, with the Southern European countries still showing far greater interest than other parts of Europe. Fifty-one percent of Spaniards and 60% of Italians preferred an EU role, increasing greatly from 2010 when levels were 34% and 47% respectively. Germany showed far lower support (35%, still up from 27% in 2010), with the lowest support evident in the U.K. (18%, up from 12% in 2010).

LABOR MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS

Strong Preference for Highly Educated Immigrants, but Job Offer Trumps Skill Level

Majorities everywhere in Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2011 supported increasing admissions of highly educated immigrants, with the approval of 63% of U.S. and 62% of European
respondents. On the other hand, when asked to which type of immigrant the government should give preference — a highly educated immigrant with no job offer or a lower educated immigrant with a job offer — majorities or pluralities in all countries preferred the lower educated worker with a job offer.

**Immigrants Help to Fill Jobs where there are Shortages of Workers**
Since the beginning of the survey in 2008, majorities of respondents in all countries have agreed that immigrants generally help to fill jobs where there are shortages of workers. Even in the U.K., where respondents are typically skeptical of immigration’s impact, 66% in 2013 agreed that immigrants fill labor-market gaps, though that number dropped from 77% in 2008. France, on the other hand, has become increasingly skeptical of immigrants’ plugging of labor-market gaps. In 2008, an overwhelming majority of the French (84%) said that they agreed that immigrants fill labor shortages. In 2013, this number was down to 68%, though up from 52% in 2010. In the United States, 77% in 2008 thought that immigrants help to fill jobs; this number decreased to 69% in 2013. In 2013, Germans were the most likely in Europe (75%) to say that immigrants fill jobs.

**Immigrants Help to Create Jobs as they Set Up New Businesses**
North Americans, whose economies have benefitted from immigrant entrepreneurs for decades, have shown that they recognize the job-creating ability of such immigrants. In 2013, 54% of Americans agreed that immigrants help create jobs as they set up new businesses,
with agreement stable since 2009 when the question was first asked. In the U.K., 43% agreed in 2009, rising continuously to 52% in 2013. In 2013 in Spain and France on the other hand, majorities said that immigrants do not help to create jobs as they set up new businesses, with 58% in the former and 54% in the latter.

**Europeans Say Immigrants do not Take Jobs Away from Native Born, Americans Split**

One commonly voiced fear about immigration is that it will displace the local workforce. Transatlantic Trends gauged public opinion on this sentiment and found that Europeans polled in 2013 on average disagree (67%), saying that immigrants do not take jobs away from native-born citizens, while Americans are split on this, with 47% disagreeing and 50% saying that they do. These patterns have remained relatively stable since 2008 when this question was first asked. Particular country results are interesting for Europe, with Germans showing the highest disagreement — with 80% stating that immigrants do not take jobs away — and large majorities in France (69%), Italy (67%), and the Netherlands (62%) saying the same. Most notably, a majority in the U.K. (51%) believed that immigrants do take jobs away, also a stable trend since 2008.
Perceptions about Immigration’s Impact on Labor Markets Correlate with Respondents’ Own Economic Situations

It is often said that attitudes and opinion on migration and its impact on the labor market are correlated with one’s own economic situation. Thus, in its third year (2010), the survey included a number of questions to get a profile of respondents’ own economic situation and perspective on the economy in order to compare those profiles to attitudes. Overall, the findings confirmed that perceptions about immigration’s impact on labor markets were highly sensitive to respondents’ own employment status, financial situation, and worries about national labor markets.

In Canada and in all five continental European countries surveyed, majorities said that immigrants do not take jobs away from native born; 58% of British and 56% of U.S. respondents disagreed, saying that they do. Similarly, 52% of U.S. and British respondents in 2010 thought that immigrants lower the wages of citizens, an opinion that contrasted with that of Canadians and most other Europeans, who said that immigrants do not lower wages for the native-born. The only exception was Spain, where 52% thought that immigrants lower Spanish wages. It should be noted, however, that this was down ten percentage points from 2009, when 62% of the Spanish thought that immigrants lowered wages. On labor-market competition overall, it seems that the U.K. and the United States most consistently claim that immigrants make the employment situation worse for native-born workers.

The economic crisis may also have had an effect on attitudes about job competition. Among Europeans whose household financial situation got worse over the 12 months before the survey, 39% said that immigrants take jobs away from natives. This compares to European respondents whose personal economic situation stayed the same or got better, only 32% of whom thought that immigrants take jobs. These findings were consistent across European countries, with the exception of France and Italy, where their personal economic situation had no appreciable effect on attitudes. The most striking difference, however, was found in the United States, where 63% of those whose situation got worse feared immigrant job competition. Of those whose situation got better or stayed the same, only 49% felt similarly.

Public Favors Permanent Settlement over Temporary Labor Migration Schemes

When designing admission policies for legal labor migration, policymakers often deliberate between short-term or temporary admissions and permanent intake of legal migrants for work purposes. Among policymakers, it is often assumed that the public is more in favor of restrictive temporary admission schemes. However, the survey’s findings did not support this notion. In 2008, Transatlantic Trends: Immigration asked whether legal immigrants who come to the country to work should only be admitted temporarily and then be required to return to their country of origin or whether they should be given the opportunity to stay permanently.

Only 26% in Europe and 27% in the United States thought that legal immigrants should be admitted temporarily for work and then be required to return to their country of origin. In fact, 64% in Europe and 62% in the United States favored giving legal immigrants the opportunity to stay permanently. This trend continued in 2009, 2010, and 2011. The only country in
the European sample that saw a departure from majority support over the years was the U.K., with 47% favoring permanent settlement in 2011, down 10% from 2008.

INTEGRATION AND BELONGING

Immigrants not Seen as a Threat to National Culture
When asked whether “immigrants are a threat to our national culture” in Transatlantic Trends 2013, two-thirds majorities in Europe (69%) and the United States (64%) said that they are not, with large majorities saying that in Spain (80%), Germany (77%), Italy (75%), Romania (75%), and Portugal (74%). The highest numbers of respondents agreeing that immigrants are a threat to national culture were found in Turkey (55%) and the U.K. (46%). After years of public debate about immigration as a cultural threat in the Netherlands and France, only one-third of respondents in the Netherlands (33%) and France (34%) agreed that immigrants are a threat to the national culture.

Immigrants Must be Able to Integrate Culturally and Economically
In debates over immigration policies, some have suggested that preference for admission should be given to immigrants who will fit in smoothly with national culture; others maintain instead that the most important thing is employment. The survey in 2009 gauged public opinion on this debate, and respondents clearly indicated that it is not enough for immigrants to be able to manage one or the other exclusively — they must do both. When asked about admitting an immigrant with a good chance of finding a job but who would not fit in
smoothly, 66% of respondents rejected this as a bad idea; 67% said the same about admitting an immigrant without a job offer but with the ability to easily integrate culturally. However, when asked about letting in a group of new immigrants who could easily find a job and would also fit in smoothly, 75% of respondents thought this would be a good idea. There were, however, some transatlantic differences. North Americans seemed to prefer economic integration, whereas the Dutch put comparatively stronger emphasis on cultural adaptation.

**Public Strongly Supports Language Classes, Banning Discrimination, and Teaching Mutual Respect**
When asked about concrete integration policies in Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2008, respondents across the board were very much in favor of several integration measures. In Europe and the United States, “banning the discrimination against legal immigrants in the labor market” was supported by 81% and 72% of respondents, respectively. Eighty-five percent and 88% supported “offering free language courses,” and overwhelming averages of 94% and 88% supported “promoting the teaching of mutual respect in schools.”

**Most Important Naturalization Requirements: Respect for National Political Institutions and Laws and Language Skills**
Citizenship rules and access to national citizenship through naturalization have been hotly debated, with a general push toward raising cultural, civic, and linguistic requirements for foreigners by requiring citizenship classes, tests, and contracts. These tools are thought to
ensure the smooth integration of new citizens into national societies. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration in 2011 asked respondents what are the most important preconditions for naturalization: being able to speak the national language, respecting political institutions and laws, having lived in the country for most of one’s life, or sharing cultural values. Overall, the public quite consistently prioritized respect for national political institutions and laws, as well as the ability to speak the national language, over either cultural fit or long-term residence: 74% of European and 68% of U.S. respondents chose the former attributes over the latter. There is variation within Europe, however, on the relative weight given to the different options. Germans valued language by a large margin, with 44% of Germans saying that the ability to speak the national language was the most important precondition for obtaining citizenship, compared to 26% of U.K. respondents and only 6% of Italian and 5% of Spanish respondents. Italians were the most focused on respecting national institutions and laws (75%), compared to a European average of 52%.
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