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Transatlantic Trends

— | IMMIGRATION | —



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Key Findings | 2011

Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2011 Partners

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TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration

Highlights of Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2011

The results of the 2011 *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* survey capture U.S. and European public opinion on a range of immigration and integration issues. The most important highlights of this year's survey show 1) there is a remarkable stability of general immigration opinions over time, 2) the public supports European Union burden-sharing on migration resulting from the Arab Spring and increasingly favors European responsibility for setting immigrant admissions numbers, and 3) the public tends to favor highly educated immigrants but still prefers immigrants with a job offer.

Now in its fourth year, *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* (TTI) measures public opinion on immigration and integration issues on both sides of the Atlantic. The countries included in the 2011 version of the survey were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. When the report refers to European respondents, it is only meant to refer to the opinions of those in the five European countries surveyed this year.

In 2011, immigration and integration continued to be matters of intense policy discussion in both the United States and Europe. One of the most important developments in international affairs, the so-called Arab Spring, had a direct impact on immigration dynamics, with political upheaval leading to the movement of migrants within and out of North Africa and the Middle East. Italy complained of a lack of European burden-sharing on the flows of migrants, pressures most evident on the island of Lampedusa. Disagreements within Europe about the responsibility for dealing with migrants and refugees in the context of continuing economic crisis resulted in avid debates about the free movement area. The United Kingdom introduced an immigration cap for non-European

Union economic migrants, with wide dispute over the feasibility of the cap and the impact for businesses and society. On the other side of the Atlantic, Americans debated the appropriate role of states and localities in immigration enforcement, as well as the possibilities of streamlining deportation procedures and providing legalization relief to illegal immigrants.

TTI was able to address the most pressing international developments of 2011 by asking the public about their principal concerns — the economy and unemployment — as well as the Arab Spring. Given the widespread worry about the economy and migration flows from North Africa, it is particularly interesting that measures of general attitudes on immigration did not change very much this year in comparison to the previous three years of the TTI survey.

Strong majorities in all countries polled in Europe supported European burden-sharing on the North African crisis. In addition, support for a greater European Union role in determining national immigration policies increased since last year, with rising numbers of European respondents opting for the European Union rather than their national governments to set immigrant admissions numbers for member countries.

The 2011 survey also delved into labor migration and sought to identify what the public valued most in prospective immigrants. There was a clear preference for highly educated immigrants over immigrants with low educational levels, but when faced with a trade-off — a highly educated immigrant with no job offer, or a lower educated immigrant with a job offer — majorities or pluralities in all countries *preferred the lower educated worker with a job offer*.

As a comparative study of North American and European public opinion about immigration and integration issues, *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* allows for a close look at national immigration debates, while at the same time placing national opinions into a broader transatlantic context. *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* is a joint project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Compagnia

di San Paolo, and the Barrow Cadbury Trust, with additional support from the Fundación BBVA.

Notes on Terminology: In this survey we used the term “illegal immigrant,” as opposed to “irregular” or “undocumented” migrant, to describe foreign citizens who enter, stay, and/or work in the country without the permission of the national government.

KEY FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS

- *Stability in Public Opinion.* Basic public stances on immigration have not changed notably in the last year, even in Europe where the perceived threat of movement resulting from the Arab Spring was a central issue. Immigration remained a second order concern for the public, following the economy and unemployment. Perceptions of immigration as a problem or opportunity have changed little since 2008, the first year of the survey. In 2011, 52% of Europeans and 53% of Americans polled saw immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity, with the strongest pessimism in the United Kingdom (68%).
- *Worry about Illegal but not Legal Immigration.* Majorities in all countries were worried about illegal immigration, with a European average of 67% and concern highest in Italy (80%) and Spain (74%). Worry about *legal* immigration, however, was low, with only 26% of European respondents expressing worry, and lowest in the United States where only 18% of respondents expressed worry. This showed no change from the trend in previous years.
- *U.S. Public Split Along Partisan Lines on Many Issues.* Republicans and Democrats disagreed on many issues, from the importance of immigration on the policy agenda to stances on a range of policy options. When asked if they were worried about illegal immigration, 48% of Democrats expressed concern compared to a large majority of Republicans (72%). On whether illegal immigrants should

be legalized or forced to return home, 58% of Democrats preferred legalization compared to only 33% of Republicans.

FORCED MIGRATION, THE ARAB SPRING, AND BURDEN-SHARING

- *Sympathy for Forced Migration for Various Reasons.* The public was sympathetic to the plight of migrants forced to flee their homes for a number of reasons: to avoid persecution, armed conflict, and natural disaster. Fewer but still a majority of respondents were also in favor of accepting migrants seeking to avoid poverty. Respondents in Spain (76%), Italy (68%), and the United States (64%) were the most supportive of those fleeing poor economic conditions, compared to a European average of 58%.
- *Dealing with the Arab Spring.* Europeans in general were very open to helping countries in North Africa and the Middle East experiencing the turmoil and aftermath of the Arab Spring with either trade (84% in favor) or development aid (79% in favor), though they were wary of opening their labor markets to migrants from the region (47% in favor) and would prefer that migrants who were admitted stay only temporarily. Eighty percent of European respondents supported European burden-sharing to cope with the flows emanating from the region.

- *Growing Support for European Union Authority.* Support for a European Union responsibility to set national-level immigration numbers increased to 42% this year, though the Southern European countries still show far greater interest than other parts of Europe. Sixty percent of Italians and 51% of Spaniards preferred a European Union role in establishing national immigrant numbers, increasing greatly from 2010, when levels were 47% and 34% respectively. Germany showed far lower support (35%, still up from 27% in 2010), with the lowest support in the United Kingdom (18%, up from 12% in 2010).

ECONOMIC CONCERNS

- *Differing Views on the Economic Effects of Immigration.* Except in the United States and the United Kingdom, publics generally did not agree that immigrants take jobs away from native workers. Compared to other countries, respondents in the United States and United Kingdom were the most worried about stress on public services, with 63% of respondents agreeing that immigrants place a burden on social services. Publics on both sides of the Atlantic were split on the effect of immigrants on wage levels, as well as whether they produce additional jobs by creating new businesses.
- *Strong Preference for Highly Educated Immigrants.* Majorities everywhere supported increasing admissions of highly educated immigrants, with the approval of 63% of American and 62% of European respondents. On the question of immigrants with a low level of education, however, only 36% of Americans approved increased admissions, compared to 29% of Europeans. On the other hand, when asked to which type of immigrant the government should give preference — a highly educated immigrant with no job offer or a lower educated immigrant with a job offer — majorities or pluralities in all countries preferred *the lower educated worker with a job offer*.
- *Same Criteria for Immigrants with High and Low Levels of Education.* Regarding both immigrants with high and low educational levels, publics did not consider having a similar cultural background to be a very important precondition for entry (19% of Europeans and 18% of Americans), though providing needed skills was seen as more important (36% of Europeans and 38% of Americans), as was the expectation of not using social benefits (26% of Europeans and 37% of Americans).

INTEGRATION AND BELONGING

- *Optimism about the State of Immigrant Integration.* Publics on both sides of the Atlantic were optimistic about the success of immigrant integration (52% of Europeans and 56% of Americans), and even more positive about the integration of the “second generation” or children of immigrants. Sixty-five percent of Europeans and 74% of Americans considered the children of immigrants to be well or very well integrated. Many Europeans still viewed Muslim immigrants as less well integrated than immigrants in general, though members of the second generation were seen as better integrated than their parents. Spanish respondents were the most concerned, with 64% deeming Muslim immigrants to be poorly or very poorly integrated, compared to a 53% European average.
- *Respect for National Law and Institutions Key to Citizenship.* Regarding requirements for attaining national citizenship, the public quite consistently prioritized respect for national political institutions and laws as well as the ability to speak the national language over either cultural fit or long-term residence: 74% of European and 68% of U.S. respondents chose the former attributes over the latter.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND POLICY ISSUES

- *Views of Government Performance are Poor.* There was high disapproval of government management of immigration, with 68% of Europeans and 73% of Americans believing that their governments are doing a poor or very poor job. The most discontented were the Italian respondents, 83% of whom believed their government is doing a poor or very poor job managing immigration. This was an increase from 70% in 2010.
- *Disagreement on How to Reduce Illegal Immigration.* Europeans gave much greater consideration than Americans to the value of increasing development aid to poorer countries whose citizens immigrate illegally. Thirty-two percent of Europeans chose this as the most effective policy tool to reduce illegal immigration, compared to only 11% of U.S. respondents. There was particularly high support for this tool in the Mediterranean countries: Italy (44%), France (42%), and Spain (41%). U.S. (31%) and British (44%) respondents preferred instead to reinforce border controls, or impose tougher penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants (34% and 31%).
- *Publics Divided on Legalization versus Deportation.* Fifty-two percent of Europeans thought illegal immigrants should be required to return home, while 35% preferred legalization. Americans were more evenly divided: 47% of Americans opted for return, compared to 49% in support of legalization. Strongest support for legalization was in the United States (49%) and Germany (50%), while the United Kingdom was clearly the most supportive of returning illegal immigrants, with 70% of those polled advocating for involuntary return. Views on legalization have a strong connection to individuals' partisan leanings.
- *U.S. Policy Debates.* A majority of the U.S. public (53%) supported the provision of citizenship to all individuals born on U.S. territory regardless of parents' immigration status. They were even more strongly supportive (65%) of the provisions of the DREAM Act, which would legalize illegal immigrant youth who enter college or the military. When asked which level of government should be responsible for immigrant enforcement, 54% preferred the federal government to have primary responsibility compared to 41% preferring state or local authorities.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration


General Perceptions

Despite a tumultuous year, public opinion remained largely stable in its assessment of immigration, which remained a second order concern. The largest percentages of respondents cited “the economy” or “unemployment” as the most important issues facing their countries. Given the continuing instability in the economy, the public is clearly focused on the challenges of high unemployment and the threat of renewed recession.

The percentage of respondents listing immigration as the most important issue stayed constant since last

year. Fifteen percent of Americans listed immigration as either their highest or second-highest concern, slightly lower than 18% of Europeans. The strongest focus on immigration was in the United Kingdom, where 30% of respondents polled chose immigration as their top or second-most important concern. This showed a decline from 2010, however, when 37% of British respondents felt that way.

When asked specifically about immigration, majorities or pluralities in all countries but Germany identified it as more of a problem than an opportunity for



their countries. Fifty-two percent of European and 53% of U.S. respondents identified it as a problem. Only in Germany did a plurality (50%) of the public see immigration as more of an opportunity than a problem.¹ In the United Kingdom there was the highest skepticism, with 68% of respondents identifying immigration as more of a problem. These trends are quite constant over time, as indicated in Chart 1.²

The stability in perceptions about immigration is important given the political upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East and subsequent movements of people. Even in Italy, which received the largest number of boat arrivals from North Africa, the discourse among political elites focusing on the threat of an “invasion” of migrants did not do much to change the public’s stance on immigration. Similar to last year, 28% of Italians saw immigration as an opportunity, 48% saw it as more of a problem, and 18% thought it was both a problem and an opportunity.

WORRY ABOUT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BUT NOT LEGAL IMMIGRATION

The perception of the public about whether most immigrants are legally or illegally present did not depart from the trends of previous years, with a constant contrast between the United States and Europe. Thirty-five percent of Europeans and 55% of Americans thought that most immigrants are in their countries illegally, while 54% of Europeans and 34% of Americans thought that most are legally present. There was great variation across publics in Europe, however. Italians consistently have the strongest perception of high illegal immigration, with 64% indicating that most immigrants are present illegally, followed by the Spanish (49%). Germany consistently demonstrates the lowest concern, with only 13% of Germans thinking that most immigrants are not legally present. This contrast parallels actual immigration flows and debates in these two countries, with illegal immigrants not being a top policy issue in Germany as opposed to immigration discussions in

¹ There is no majority for either response among Germans, as 50% said it was more of an opportunity, 43% said it was more of a problem, and 3% spontaneously offered that both were true.

² Note that Spain was not included in the survey in 2008.

the Southern European countries like Italy and Spain, as well as in the United States.

When asked specifically about whether they were *worried* about illegal immigration, the majority of respondents in all countries did express worry. The highest rates of concern were in Italy (80%), followed by Spain (74%), and the United Kingdom (71%).

Both Europeans and Americans clearly differentiated, however, between their stance on illegal immigration and on legal immigration, as depicted in Chart 2. In contrast to their high worry about *illegal* immigration (67% of Europeans and 58% of Americans), they were generally not concerned about *legal* immigration. On average, 72% of Europeans and 82% of Americans were, in fact, not worried about legal immigration. Compared to a European average of 26%, highest concern was in the United Kingdom, where 38% of the public was worried about legal immigration. The lowest concern was in the United States, where only 18% of the public expressed worry about legal immigration.


SPLIT ON IMMIGRANT LEVELS

One question that *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* has asked since 2008 is whether there are “too many,” “a lot but not too many,” or “not many” immigrants in one’s country. The responses to this question have remained relatively stable throughout the years of the survey, as seen in Chart 3. Respondents in Germany and France are consistently the least likely to say there are “too many” immigrants, versus those in the United Kingdom who have consistently been the most likely to think there are “too many” immigrants in their country.

THE PUBLIC STILL OVERESTIMATING IMMIGRANT NUMBERS

Interpreting what respondents have in mind when they say there are too many immigrants is difficult. Respondents regularly overestimate how many immigrants there actually are in their countries. In 2011, respondents were asked to estimate, on a scale of 0 to 100, the percentage of the population in their country that was born abroad. As in previous years, the public

**Chart 2:
Worry about Illegal Immigration Exceeds
Worry about Legal Immigration**




largely overestimated the percent share of immigrants in their countries. British respondents on average estimated a foreign-born population of 31.8 percent, while in fact only 11.3 percent of the population is foreign born. A similarly large overestimation was also true among U.S. respondents, who on average estimated a foreign-born stock of 37.8 percent. The actual foreign-born population is only 12.5 percent of the population in the United States.³

Respondents who were asked to estimate how many immigrants there were in their local community, rather than the national level, tended to respond with lower estimates of the foreign-born population. This was true particularly for those residents in rural communities.

³ Foreign-born stock was reported as of 2009 in the International Migration Outlook 2011 published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

PARTISAN SPLIT IN THE UNITED STATES ON MANY ISSUES

The U.S. public was split on many issues, and differences of opinion often corresponded to political party identification. Democrats seemed much less concerned than Republicans about immigration: only 9% of Democrats identified immigration as their first or second-most important concern, compared to 24% of Republicans (and 13% of Independents). On whether immigration is more of a problem or an opportunity for the United States, 47% of Democrats said it was an opportunity, over double the 21% of Republicans with that view. When asked if they were worried about illegal immigration, 48% of Democrats responded yes, compared to a large majority of Republicans (72%). On whether illegal immigrants should be legalized or forced to return home, 58% of Democrats preferred legalization compared to only 33% of Republicans (and 51% of Independents).



The split on views of birthright citizenship were striking, with 65% of Democrats supporting the granting of citizenship to children born in the United States regardless of the immigration status of their parents, compared to 34% of Republicans (and 57% of Independents). Support for legalizing illegal immigrant youths who enroll in college or the military — measures currently debated as the DREAM Act⁴

— showed less polarization, with 55% of Republicans actually in support of its provisions and 75% of Democrats (and 65% of Independents). Thirty-two percent of Democrats thought the government is doing a good or very good job managing immigration, compared to only 12% of Republicans (and 27% of Independents).

⁴ The terms “DREAM Act” were not used in the questionnaire but the question was instead phrased as, “Would you support or oppose a law that would allow illegal immigrants brought to the United States as children to gain legal resident status if they join the military or go to college?”

COUNTRY PROFILE: UNITED STATES

Immigration debates in the United States have focused on options for dealing with a large illegal immigrant population, as well as concerns about recruiting high-skilled talent and ensuring a steady flow of labor to fill market demand. Policy discussions on enforcement continued in 2011, with a struggle between the federal government and sub-national authorities about the appropriate role of states and localities in immigration enforcement. In the wake of failed federal immigration reform, many state legislatures have passed immigration legislation in the last several years, with some taking strong enforcement measures to identify illegal immigrants, as Alabama did in the fall of 2011. At the federal level, the Obama administration took steps to use prosecutorial discretion to modify deportation procedures to prioritize the most dangerous or criminal cases.

Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2011 explicitly queried the U.S. public about two current policy debates: 1) preserving the Constitutional right of birthright citizenship granted to all individuals born on U.S. territory; and 2) providing legal status to illegal immigrant youth who grow up in the United States and enter college or join the U.S. military, provisions being considered under the DREAM Act. Majorities of the U.S. public supported both measures. Fifty-three percent of

Americans polled agreed that all children born in the United States should automatically become U.S. citizens. Sixty-five percent of those polled supported the provisions of the DREAM Act.

On birthright citizenship, young respondents tended to be more supportive than older respondents, as were Democrats (65% of whom supported it versus 34% of Republicans and 57% of Independents). Living in an urban setting also was connected to support for this measure, but education level did not have any particular effect.

On the question of legalizing youths, young respondents again were more supportive than older respondents, despite the fact that they would be more likely to be competing with the legalized youth at university and on the job market. The partisan split was not as obvious here, with Republicans showing a majority (55%) in support of the legalization of youths compared to 75% of Democrats and 65% of Independents.

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS

Immigrant population in the United States	38,517,200
Immigrant share of overall population	12.5%
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2011, foreign-born data for 2009	



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration

Special Focus 2011: Forced Migration, the Arab Spring, and Burden-Sharing

2011 was a tumultuous year in world politics, with democratic uprisings occurring in many countries in North Africa and the Middle East. The proximity of these regions to Europe meant that this upheaval raised the possibility of major movements of migrants fleeing from conflict and instability. There were disagreements within Europe about which states should be responsible for coping with migrant flows — the country where the migrants first arrive, or those to which they transit — and pushes by several countries such as France to back away from the open mobility model to keep migrants from moving freely within the region. Political rhetoric on the potential “invasion” of fleeing Libyans and other migrants was particularly strong in Italy, where the island of Lampedusa has been a focus of population pressure and unrest. Italy has asked for more support from the European Union to cope with the flows from North Africa.

Given the centrality of these developments in international affairs in 2011, the *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* survey this year queried the public on forced migration in general, as well as specific policy options to deal with the consequences of the Arab Spring.

STRONG SUPPORT FOR ADMITTING FORCED MIGRANTS IN GENERAL

In regards to refugees and other migrants fleeing from dangerous conditions, the survey results show that the public was sympathetic to the plight of individuals who are forced to emigrate and seek safety in a receiving country. The public was even more receptive when they perceive the cause of migration to be beyond the individual’s control, such as armed conflict or natural disaster. See Chart 4 depicting


public support for forced migration based on different causes: poverty; political, ethnic, or religious persecution; physical harm from armed conflict; or the aftermath of a natural disaster. Strong majorities in all countries supported allowing people in for three of the four causes, with distinctly lower but still majority or plurality support for those fleeing poverty. On average, 58% of Europeans supported entrance for those avoiding poverty. Support for this type of migrant seemed to be split in two groups: lowest support in Germany (50%), the United Kingdom (51%), and France (52%), and highest in Spain (76%), Italy (68%), and the United States (64%). The highest support across the board was for those people avoiding armed conflict, with 79% of Europeans and 74% of Americans in favor of allowing such migrants.

Those respondents concerned about immigrants posing a burden on social services were, not surprisingly, less supportive of accepting those fleeing poverty. Among those concerned about social burden, 75% did not want to accept people escaping from poor economic conditions; this compares to 50% among those polled who did not worry about immigrants posing a social burden.

POLICY OPTIONS ON THE ARAB SPRING

Though generally sympathetic toward forced migrants, the European public did seem more wary about letting in migrants produced by the political events taking place in North Africa and the Middle East. When asked about different policy options to help the countries committed to pursuing democracy in the region, publics strongly supported opening up trade (84%) and providing development aid (79%), but were less supportive of opening up their labor markets to individuals from the region (47%).

**Chart 4:
Sympathy for Many Types of Forced Migrants**



Source: Q21.1-21.4; see Chart Index

Differences among European countries were evident, however, as shown in Chart 5. Clear majorities in Italy and Spain (57%) *supported* opening up their labor markets while clear majorities *opposed* the measure in the United Kingdom (56%) and Germany (55%). Support for trade liberalization was very strong in all countries, but highest in Germany (87%) and Spain (86%). Support for development aid showed more variation, and was highest in Italy (84%) and Spain (85%).


Those respondents who were more concerned with the negative economic consequences of immigration — wage reduction, displacement of native workers, and pressure on social services — were generally more opposed than average to opening up the national labor market to fleeing North Africans. This was even true when taking into account the effect of educational background.

TEMPORARY ENTRY OF NORTH AFRICANS IS ACCEPTABLE

Majorities in all countries polled in Europe supported allowing migrants from North Africa to come and live *temporarily* — 61% of respondents in Europe supported temporary stay, with highest support among Germans (68%). On the other hand, among the half of respondents who were asked about permanent stay, majorities opposed letting entrants in permanently. Only 39% of Europeans supported permanent stay, with 57% opposing. Opposition was highest in the United Kingdom, where 65% of the public opposed the permanent stay of North Africans.

SUPPORT FOR BURDEN-SHARING IN EUROPE

Strong majorities in all countries polled in Europe supported European burden-sharing on the North African crisis, with 80% of respondents agreeing that responsibility should be shared by all countries in the European Union rather than borne solely by the country where migrants first arrive. Once again,



lowest support was expressed in the United Kingdom (68%), and highest support in Italy (88%) followed by Spain (85%), as seen in Chart 6. In those countries most proximate to the movement and bearing the brunt of flows, the public expressed the greatest interest in receiving support from other countries in the region. This diversity speaks directly to the contrasting perspectives on migration issues experienced in different parts of the European continent, and the continuing challenges of cooperation and harmonization of practices.


GROWING SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNION DECISION-MAKING

Transatlantic Trends: Immigration also asked Europeans about the appropriate role for European Union involvement in general immigration considerations — specifically whether the European Union should decide how many immigrants should be accepted into each European Union country. Though support for this was lower than for North African


crisis burden-sharing, there was still some support for a strong European Union responsibility in national immigration admissions numbers, with an average of 42% approval among European respondents.

The European average still does not indicate majority support, but support for European decision-making on immigration numbers has increased in all countries since the last *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* survey, with the Southern European countries still showing far greater interest than other parts of Europe. As illustrated in Chart 7, 51% of Spaniards and 60% of Italians preferred a European Union role, increasing greatly from 2010 when levels were 34% and 47% respectively. Germany showed far lower support (35%, still up from 27% in 2010), with the lowest support evident in the United Kingdom (18%, up from 12% in 2010).

**Chart 6:
Support for EU Burden Sharing on North African Migrants**



**Chart 7:
Rising Support for EU Responsibility in Setting National Immigrant Admissions Numbers**



COUNTRY PROFILE: ITALY

In 2011, Italy was presented with the direct challenge of migrants fleeing from North Africa, and asked the European Union for assistance in protecting its borders. A focal point of these pressures was the island of Lampedusa, where thousands of migrants arrived and were classified as economic migrants rather than refugees. Italy set up an agreement with the new Tunisian government to manage the flows, and Italian political discourse decried the “invasion” of migrants from the struggling region.

Given these extreme circumstances, it is notable how *little* Italian public opinion has changed regarding immigration issues. TTI results showed, for example, that the percentage of Italians considering immigration to be the most or second-most important issue facing Italy did not change from 2010 (21%); there was also a decrease in the percent of Italians believing that there were “too many” immigrants (48%, down from 53% in 2010). Concern about illegal immigration was already very high, and this did not change in response to developments in 2011. The percentage of Italians describing immigration as culturally enriching even *increased* from 49 to 58% in 2011.

Italians still expressed the strongest displeasure of all countries polled with their own government’s management of immigration. Eighty-three percent of Italian respondents believed their government is doing a “poor” or “very poor” job managing immigration, up from 70% in 2010.

Perhaps by extension, Italian respondents were the most fervent about a strong European Union role in immigration management. Italians were the strongest supporters of the European Union role, with 88% advocating for European burden-sharing on the North African crisis, and a record 60% agreeing that the European Union should decide how many immigrants are allowed to enter each member country (up from 47% in 2010). This may indicate a growing trend in Italy to seek out a European role in Mediterranean migration challenges.

One might expect significant regional differences of public opinion within Italy, for example stronger skepticism in the south due to its proximity to the direct arrival of migrants from Africa and beyond. TTI results did not show significant differences in opinion across the regions, other than a greater worry about illegal immigrants in the south where indeed the phenomenon is more visible. Italians in all the regions were equally disappointed in their government’s handling of immigration and share the general views on immigrant numbers and immigration as a problem.

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS

Immigrant population in Italy	4,570,317
Immigrant share of overall population	7.5%
Source: National Institute of Statistics, data for 2011	



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration


Economic Concerns

In 2011, TTI devoted significant attention to the role of economic concerns in shaping public opinion on immigration. A number of questions were posed specifically on skilled immigration and designed to pinpoint what the public considers the most important criteria for entry: job skills, a high educational level, a job offer, or cultural fit with native society. *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* showed that perceptions of immigration are shaped by both cultural and economic concerns.

CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION ON NATIONAL ECONOMIES

TTI queried the public on perceptions of what the labor market consequences of immigration are for the receiving society. As seen in Chart 8 below, strong majorities in all countries agreed that immigrants help fill jobs where there are shortages of workers. Seventy-three percent of Europeans and 68% of U.S. respondents agreed that immigrants fill labor market gaps.

Except in the United States and the United Kingdom, publics generally did not agree that immigrants take



COUNTRY PROFILE: UNITED KINGDOM

Discussions in the United Kingdom have continued to focus on reducing immigration. An immigration cap for non-European Union economic migrants has been introduced, but its feasibility and impact are being widely debated. Respondents in the United Kingdom followed the trend of the past three years of the *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* survey by consistently being more skeptical about immigration and more pro-enforcement than respondents in other countries polled. British respondents were the most wary of immigration on many portions of the questionnaire, with a record 68% considering immigration more of a problem than an opportunity, and 70% in favor of deporting illegal immigrants rather than legalizing them.

The United Kingdom has a unique place in European discussions on immigration because of its particular geography and relationship with

the European Union. Respondents in the United Kingdom were the most skeptical of European Union decision-making, with only 18% agreeing that the European Union should have responsibility for setting national immigrant admission numbers. This shows an increase from 2010, when 12% of British respondents approved of European Union decision-making. In response to questions about the Arab Spring, British respondents were much more likely to support European burden-sharing, but their 68% of approval was still the lowest of all the countries polled and far below the European average of 80%.

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS

Immigrant population in the United Kingdom	6,899,000
Immigrant share of overall population	11.3%
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2011, foreign-born data for 2009	

jobs away from native workers, with only 34% of European respondents expressing concern. The United States (57%) and the United Kingdom (58%) were more concerned than continental Europe about the displacement of native workers. This may correspond in part to the fact that in both countries, native workers are in fact more exposed to market competition and are not as protected by government regulations as in continental Europe. Respondents in the United States and United Kingdom also seemed more concerned than continental Europe about the burden immigrants pose on social services. Majorities in all countries except Germany agreed that immigrants are a burden on social services, but the highest concern was found in the United States and the United Kingdom (63%) compared to a 53% European average.

Publics were split on whether immigrants help produce jobs as they set up new businesses. Fifty-four percent of Americans and 48% of Europeans thought that immigrant entrepreneurs have the potential to grow the economy by creating new jobs. The Spanish

were the least optimistic in this regard, with only 32% of Spaniards agreeing that immigrant entrepreneurship creates new jobs.

The effect of immigrant workers on wages is also an issue of debate in policy circles, and the public largely seemed split on whether immigrants bring down the wages of native citizens. Highest concern was again in the United States (53%) and the United Kingdom (52%), as well as Spain (55%); while majorities in France (63%), Germany (57%), and Italy (54%) *disagreed* with the notion that immigrants bring down the wages of native citizens.

A PREFERENCE FOR SKILLED IMMIGRATION

Many of the immigration debates in North America, Europe, and beyond have focused on recruiting “the best and the brightest” immigrants. Some countries like Canada and Australia have targeted skilled immigrants by opting for points systems that prioritize educational credentials and specific job qualifications. It is generally understood that the recruitment of


highly trained or skilled immigrants is less controversial than the recruitment of unskilled immigrants, the latter of whom are viewed as placing a greater burden on society and potentially posing more challenges for integration. Although debates for comprehensive immigration reform are largely stalled in the United States, for example, there are current discussions in Congress about policies to facilitate entrance for trained scientists and engineers. Discussions about easing entry restrictions for highly educated immigrants, particularly scientists and engineers, are seen as more politically palatable than discussions on legalization or changing immigration levels in general.

The general preference for skilled immigration was certainly confirmed by the TTI poll in 2011. As depicted in Chart 9, strong majorities in all countries were *favorable* to admitting more immigrants with a high level of education and were *opposed* to letting in more immigrants with a low level of education. Sixty-three percent of U.S. respondents believed the country should let in more immigrants with a high level of education,


compared to only 36% on entrants with a low level of education. In Europe, 62% of respondents supported more highly educated immigrants, but only 29% agreed that more immigrants with low educational levels should be permitted. British respondents were the most wary of immigrants with low educational levels, with only 17% in favor of letting in more of them.

A JOB OFFER IS IMPORTANT

Although publics on the whole favored letting in more skilled immigrants, they would still prefer an incoming immigrant to have a job offer in hand. When asked to which type of immigrant the government should give preference — a highly educated immigrant with no job offer or a lower educated immigrant with a job offer — majorities or pluralities in all countries preferred *the lower educated worker with a job offer*. As seen in Chart 10, majorities of Spanish (68%), French (68%), Italian (63%), German (52%), and British respondents (52%), and a plurality (48%) of U.S. respondents thought the government should give preference to lower educated immigrants with a job offer.



**Chart 10:
Preferences on Immigrant Background:
A Job Offer is Important**




TOPIC SPOTLIGHT: EDUCATION

Transatlantic Trends Immigration: 2011 identified some interesting patterns regarding the relationship between respondents' educational background and expressed opinion on immigration. According to some economic expectations, one would anticipate that those who would be competing with high-skilled immigrants for jobs would be more opposed to their entrance into the national market. However, the poll results showed that support for high-skilled immigrants was actually higher among respondents with higher educational credentials. In fact, respondents with low educational levels were more likely to *oppose* both immigrants with low and immigrants with high levels of education, while highly educated respondents were more likely to *support* immigrants of both types. Even when taking into account

respondents' economic situation, the more highly educated were still more supportive than the less-educated of letting in more educated immigrants, even though less-educated natives do not compete with highly educated migrants. This suggests that issues of economic competition are not the only factors driving attitudes about immigration.

In a statistical analysis controlling for other demographic factors and including individual country effects, education was found not to have an independent effect on attitudes of support for immigrants with high or low educational levels. On the other hand, stances on the consequences of immigration (native job displacement, social burden, cultural enrichment) were significant predictors of these attitudes.



SAME CRITERIA FOR IMMIGRANTS WITH HIGH AND LOW LEVELS OF EDUCATION

Several questions in the 2011 TTI sought to identify which factors the public values the most in setting criteria for entry, for both skilled and unskilled immigrants. Respondents were asked how important it was that 1) immigrants come from a cultural background similar to the native population, 2) immigrants have skills needed in the country, and 3) immigrants will not use social benefits. Half of the public was asked these questions regarding highly educated immigrants, and the other half regarding immigrants with a low educational level. Publics seemed to value economic fit the most consistently, with 36% of Europeans and 38% of Americans listing skills as “very important.”⁵ This compared to only 19% of

Europeans and 18% of Americans who deemed a similar cultural background to be “very important.” Immigrants’ use of social benefits was a slightly more prominent concern than cultural background, with 26% of Europeans and 37% of Americans considering it “very important.”

As evident in Chart 11, results did not differ notably across the two sets of responses regarding immigrants with high and low educational levels, with general agreement that skills were important and cultural fit not as important for both types of entrants. Americans (44%) were more likely than Europeans (28%), however, to regard the use of social services by immigrants with low educational levels to be “very important,” and seemed less worried about this in regards to highly educated immigrants (29%).

⁵ The answers of those respondents asked about highly educated immigrants did not differ notably from those of the other half of respondents who were asked about immigrants with a low educational level, as seen in Chart 11. Figures reported here compile the results for each question.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration

Integration and Belonging

Immigration is not merely an economic phenomenon but also poses social and cultural challenges and opportunities for societies dealing with diverse populations. Continuing concern about the integration of Muslim immigrants is a dominant theme in European immigration debates, while discussions in the United States focus more on the linguistic integration of largely Spanish-speaking immigrants. Analyzing public attitudes on the cultural impacts of immigration and the success or failure of immigrant integration is an important contribution of the *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* survey.

IMMIGRATION AS ENRICHING

Transatlantic Trends: Immigration asked publics in Europe and the United States whether they thought that immigration enriches national culture with new customs and ideas or negatively impacts national culture. Majorities in all countries except the United Kingdom saw immigration as culturally enriching, with 58% of Europeans and 55% of Americans agreeing. Only 42% of the public in the United Kingdom saw immigration as culturally enriching, with 50% emphasizing its negative effect on culture.

This view has remained relatively constant over the last three years in which the question was asked, with an important increase in Italy from 49% in 2010 to 58% in 2011 agreeing with the opinion that immigration enriches national culture.

OPTIMISM ABOUT IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

Publics in both Europe and the United States were optimistic about the state of immigrant integration, particularly about the successful integration of the children of immigrants who are born in the country, or members of the “second generation.” As shown

in Chart 12, majorities or pluralities in all countries except the United Kingdom agreed that immigrants are integrating “well” or “very well,” with the highest approval reflected in Italy (59%) and Spain (62%). On average, 52% of Europeans and 56% of Americans considered immigrants to be integrating “well” or “very well.”

When asked about the members of the second generation, approval ratings were much higher, with strong majorities in all countries agreeing that the children of immigrants are integrating “well” or “very well.” Sixty-five percent of Europeans and 74% of Americans considered the children of immigrants to be “well” or “very well” integrated. The highest concern was in France and Germany, where 38% of the public considered the children of immigrants to be “poorly” or “very poorly” integrated.

Europeans still considered Muslim immigrants to pose higher integration challenges than other immigrants, with only 40% of Europeans rating Muslim immigrants as integrating “well” or “very well.” This compares to 50% of Americans who believed Muslim immigrants are integrating “well” or “very well.” In some countries such as the United Kingdom and France, there was little to no distinction between the perceived integration success of “immigrants” and “Muslim immigrants.” On the other hand, large disparities in views were seen in the Spanish (33 points), Italian (18 points), and German (11 points) publics, with consistently lower evaluations of Muslim immigrant integration. Spaniards showed the greatest concern about Muslim immigrant integration, with only 29% agreeing that Muslim immigrants are well integrated. Thirty percent of Spaniards believed that Muslim immigrants are integrating “very poorly” and another 34% “poorly.”

However, publics generally viewed the children of Muslim immigrants as more successfully integrated than their parents, with 55% of Europeans and 68% of Americans stating that the Muslim second generation is integrating “well” or “very well.”

Americans did not make much distinction between Hispanic immigrants and immigrants in general, with views of Hispanic immigrant integration consistent with views of immigrant integration in general.

NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENTS

The rules governing citizenship have been a major focus of European discussions on immigration and diversity over the last decade. Citizenship rules and

access to national citizenship through naturalization have been hotly debated, with a general push toward raising cultural, civic, and linguistic requirements for foreigners by requiring citizenship classes, tests, and contracts. These tools are thought to ensure the smooth integration of new citizens into national societies.

Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2011 asked the public what are the most important preconditions for naturalization. Overall, the public quite consistently prioritized respect for national political institutions and laws, as well as the ability to speak the national language, over either cultural fit or long-term residence: as shown in Chart 13, 74% of European and 68% of U.S. respondents chose the former attributes

COUNTRY PROFILE: GERMANY

Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 2010 comment on the “failure of multiculturalism” reflects a continuing discussion in Germany fortified by Thilo Sarrazin’s 2010 book, *Germany Does Away With Itself*, which made strong claims about the negative effects of Muslim immigration on German society. It is interesting to note that the TTI results did not show a significant change in German public opinion regarding immigration or immigrant integration despite the recent salience of perceived integration challenges in the public debate. German respondents were generally positive about immigration — this was the only country where half of the public viewed immigration as more of an opportunity than a problem, with 50% agreeing with this view compared to an average of 35% of Europeans polled. German respondents were the most likely of any to see acquisition of the country’s dominant language as a measure of integration, with a record 44% (double the European average of 22%) choosing language ability as the most important precondition for obtaining German citizenship.

Despite the questions raised by Merkel, Sarrazin, and others, the poll showed a decline in concern


about integration in Germany, although significant dissatisfaction remained with regard to Muslim immigrants specifically. Fifty-eight percent of Germans believed that Muslim immigrants are integrating poorly, which decreased from 67% in 2010. Following the larger trend, Germans were less pessimistic about the Muslim second generation, with 45% believing they are integrating poorly; this is down from 57% in 2010.

German respondents were asked their view of government’s success at integrating immigrants. Results showed no change between 2010 and 2011, with 38% of Germans in both years believing the government has been doing a “good” or “very good” job at integration efforts. In 2011, 58% of Germans thought their government was doing a “poor” or “very poor” job at integrating immigrants.

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS


Immigrant population in Germany	10,601,000
Immigrant share of overall population	12.9%
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2011, foreign-born data for 2009	

Chart 12:
Positive Evaluation of Immigrant Integration,
Particularly the Second Generation



Source: Q29-30; see Chart Index

Chart 13:
Most Important for Citizenship Acquisition



Source: Q10a; see Chart Index

COUNTRY PROFILE: FRANCE

France made headlines in 2011 for its objection to the Italian policy of accepting fleeing Tunisian and other North African migrants in the wake of political upheavals in North Africa. France rejected the entry of many of these migrants at its borders and even blocked trains entering from Italy, urging Italy to accept returned individuals and follow the Dublin Rule by which the country of first entry must process asylum applicants. *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2011* showed, however, that the French public strongly supported burden-sharing when it comes to addressing migration from North Africa. Asked if primary responsibility for incoming migrants should be shared by all countries in the European Union or be borne by the country where they first arrived, 75% supported a shared responsibility.

In a number of other respects, France seemed to align with the Mediterranean countries of Spain and Italy, including in their shared support for foreign aid as a deterrent to illegal immigration: 42% of French respondents, compared to 41% of Spanish and 44% of Italian respondents, considered aid to be the most useful tool for reducing illegal immigration.

over the latter. There is variation within Europe, however, on the relative weight given to the different options. Germans valued language by a large margin, with 44% of Germans saying that the ability to speak the national language was the most important precondition

for obtaining citizenship, compared to only 6% of Italians and 5% of Spaniards. Italians were the most focused on respecting national institutions and laws (75%), compared to a European average of 52%.

The French showed significant concern about immigrant integration and were less positive than some other publics about the success of the integration of the second generation. The highest concern about the integration of children of immigrants was reflected in France and Germany, where 38% of the public considered the children of immigrants to be “poorly” or “very poorly” integrated. The French public also showed high disapproval of its government’s management of immigration, with 66% of respondents describing it as “poor” or “very poor.” This discontent may explain the recent support surrounding Marine Le Pen, who took over leadership of the far-right National Front party from her father in early 2011.

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS

Immigrant population in France	7,234,800
Immigrant share of overall population	11.6%
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2011, estimated foreign-born data for 2009	



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration

Government Performance and Policy Issues

STRONG DISCONTENTMENT WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE ON IMMIGRATION MANAGEMENT

People on both sides of the Atlantic were unhappy with their government's performance on managing immigration. Sixty-eight percent of Europeans thought that their governments are doing a "poor" or "very poor" job, compared to 73% of Americans. This shows relative stability compared to 2010 when the question was last asked. The most discontented were the Italian respondents, 83% of whom believed their government is doing a "poor" or "very poor" job managing immigration. This increased from 2010, when 70% of Italians reported to be unhappy with government immigration management.

AMERICANS SUPPORT FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW

In the last several years in the United States, a number of states and localities have cited stalled federal immigration reform as a reason to enact their own immigration laws. Individual states have opted for greater or lesser roles in federal immigration enforcement, with the strongest measures taken in Alabama in the fall of 2011, following the model of Arizona and other states. Many of these discussions have focused on the appropriate role for local and state police in immigration enforcement duties and the access of illegal immigrants to public services.

When the U.S. public was asked which level of government should have primary responsibility to enforce immigration laws, 54% preferred the federal government, compared to 41% who preferred state or local authorities. This showed a very slight increase in support for federal responsibility since *Transatlantic*


Trends: Immigration in 2010, when 50% of Americans chose the federal option.

DISAGREEMENT ON SOLUTIONS FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

When asked what the most effective solutions for reducing illegal immigration are, it is clear that Europeans give much greater consideration than Americans to the value of increasing development aid to poorer countries whose citizens immigrate illegally. Thirty-two percent of Europeans chose this as the most effective policy tool, compared to only 11% of Americans. As shown in Chart 14, there was particularly high support for this tool in the Mediterranean countries: Italy (44%), France (42%), and Spain (41%).

U.S. and British respondents preferred instead to reinforce border controls (31% and 44%) or impose tougher penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants (34% and 31%). There was a notable increase in support in several countries since 2010 for punishing employers who hire illegal immigrants or so-called "employer sanctions:" the portion of the population choosing it as the most effective policy option went up from 16 to 26% in Italy, from 17 to 27% in Spain, and from 21 to 31% in the United Kingdom.

On the option of making it easier for immigrants to enter legally, the United States and Germany were the highest supporters, with 20% of Americans and 21% of Germans choosing this policy option as the most effective to reduce illegal immigration. This compares to only 5% of British, 8% of French, and 9% of Italian and Spanish respondents who chose legal admissions as the best solution for illegal immigration.



LEGALIZATION IS DEEPLY DIVISIVE AND PARTISAN ISSUE

Since 2008, TTI has asked respondents in Europe and the United States about their preferences for dealing with immigrants who are living in their countries illegally. In 2011, 52% of Europeans thought illegal immigrants should be required to return to their country of origin, while 35% preferred to give them the opportunity to obtain legal status. Americans were more evenly divided: 47% of them opted for return, compared to 49% in support of legalization. Strongest support for legalization was in the United States (49%) and Germany (50%), while the United Kingdom was clearly the most supportive of returning illegal immigrants, with 70% of those polled advocating for involuntary return. Legalization has not been widely debated in the past year in the United Kingdom, but it certainly has been central to the debate over comprehensive immigration reform in the United States.

Views on legalization have a strong connection to individuals' partisan leanings. In the United

States, 58% of Democrats opted for legalization, as opposed to only 33% of Republicans, and 51% of Independents. In Europe as well, 49% of those considered left-leaning supported legalization, compared to 32% of respondents in the middle of the political spectrum, and 23% of right-leaning respondents.

TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT ADMISSIONS

Following the trend from previous years, majorities in all countries preferred permanent over temporary admission of foreign workers, agreeing that legal immigrants who come to work should be given the opportunity to stay permanently rather than be admitted temporarily and then be required to return to their country of origin. Sixty-one percent of Europeans and 62% of Americans polled preferred permanent admissions, with lowest support in the United Kingdom. Highest support for permanent stay was among Germans, 72% of whom preferred permanent stay. British respondents were the most split on this issue: 47% of British respondents supported permanent stay while 44% preferred temporary admissions.

COUNTRY PROFILE: SPAIN

Continuing to suffer from one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe, Spain has introduced temporary restrictions on Romanians seeking to work in the country. Romanians are currently the largest immigrant group, who had benefited from free access to Spain since Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007 and full access to the labor market since 2009. In 2011, the European Union approved Spain's request to reimpose work visa requirements on Romanians coming to Spanish territory through the end of 2012. Worry about the Spanish economy was clear in the TTI results; respondents in Spain showed the highest rate of concern about unemployment, with 78% listing it as the most or second-most important issue facing their country.

Respondents in Spain, a relatively new immigrant receiver that has only had a significant immigrant population for the last 15 years, are optimistic about the integration of immigrants but more concerned about the integration of Muslim immigrants in particular. The TTI results reflected strong concern about Muslim integration, with only 29% of Spanish respondents saying Muslim immigrants are well integrated compared to a European average of 40%. On the other hand, over double that proportion, 62%, believed immigrants in general are well integrated, compared to a 52% European average.

Spain is in particular geographic proximity to Africa and has had to deal with clandestine immigration and population pressures as have its other Mediterranean neighbors. Like their neighbors, Spanish respondents were very interested in European burden-sharing on the North African crisis (85%), and were the most favorable along with Italians to opening up their labor market to migrants leaving the region (57%). They were also extremely supportive of lowering trade barriers (86%) and providing development aid to the region (85%). Similarly, Spaniards were also supportive of foreign assistance as the best means to reduce illegal immigration (41%). They showed the highest rates of support for migrants seeking to avoid poverty, with 76% of Spaniards supporting the entry of such migrants compared to a 58% European average.

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS

Immigrant population in Spain	6,566,600
Immigrant share of overall population	14.3%
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2011, foreign-born data for 2009	



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration

Methodology

TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews. In each country, a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, was interviewed. In countries where 20% or more of the population only has access to a cell phone, including Spain, Italy, and the United States, 20% of the interviews were conducted by cell phone. Interviews were conducted using Random Digit Dialing between August 25, 2011, and September 18, 2011.

For results based on the national samples in each of the countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is +/- 3.1 percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the maximum margin of error is +/- 1.4 percentage points. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in

conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

The results for each country are weighted according to the following socio-demographic criteria: age, gender, region, and level of education within each country. The results for “Europe” are also weighted according to each country’s population size relative to the total population of the five European countries surveyed. For more details on the methodology used in this survey, please visit www.transatlantictrends.org.

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR) and are available to scholars and other interested parties. For more information, please consult the Roper Center at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu or the ICPSR catalogue at www.icpsr.umich.edu.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Immigration

Chart Index

CHART 1

Q27: Some people say that immigration is more of a problem for [COUNTRY]. Others see it as more of an opportunity for [COUNTRY]. Which comes closer to your point of view?

Immigration is more of a problem for [COUNTRY]*

Immigration is more of an opportunity for [COUNTRY]

CHART 2

Q4.1: Can you tell me if you are worried or not worried about...? Legal immigration

Worried*

Not worried

Q4.2: Can you tell me if you are worried or not worried about...? Illegal immigration

Worried*

Not worried

CHART 3

Q2a: Generally speaking, how do you feel about the number of people living in [COUNTRY] who were not born in [COUNTRY]? Are there too many, a lot but not too many, or not many?

Too many*

A lot but not too many

Not many

CHART 4

Q21.1-21.4: Next, I will ask your opinion about different groups of people who leave their home country for various reasons. Can you please tell me how much you would support or oppose allowing these people to enter [COUNTRY]?

- 1: People who come here to avoid poverty
 - 2: People who come here to avoid political, ethnic, or religious persecution
 - 3: People who come here to avoid physical harm from armed conflict
 - 4: People who come here to avoid the aftermath of a natural disaster
- Strongly support*
- Somewhat support*
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

CHART 5

Q22.1-22.3: In light of the developments in North Africa and the Middle East, for each of the following please tell me how much you support or oppose that [COUNTRY] helps the countries that are committed to democracy in any of the following ways? (EUROPE ONLY) Would you say you...

- 1: Providing development aid
 - 2: Opening up our economic market to allow more trade with these countries
 - 3: Opening up our labor markets to allow people from these countries to work in [COUNTRY]
- Strongly support*
- Somewhat support*
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

CHART 6

Q23: And still thinking about the developments in North Africa, should the primary responsibility for incoming migrants be shared by all countries in the EU, or should it be borne by the country where they first arrived? (EUROPE ONLY)

* Response illustrated in chart.

Responsibility should be shared by countries in EU*

Responsibility should be with the country where they first arrive

CHART 7

Q26: Some people think that the [NATIONALITY] government should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to [COUNTRY] each year. Others think that the European Union should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to each European Union country, including [COUNTRY], each year. (EUROPE ONLY) Which comes closer to your point of view?

The [NATIONALITY] government should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to [COUNTRY] each year

The European Union should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to each European Union country, including [COUNTRY], each year*

CHART 8

Q18.1-18.5: I am now going to read a few statements that are sometimes heard about immigrants in general. Could you please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of them?

- 1: Immigrants take jobs away from native born [NATIONALITY]s
- 2: Immigrants generally help to fill jobs where there are shortages of workers
- 3: Immigrants help create jobs as they set up new businesses
- 4: Immigrants bring down the wages of [NATIONALITY] citizens
- 5: Immigrants are a burden on social services

Strongly agree*
Somewhat agree*
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

CHART 9

Q6a: How much do you agree or disagree that [COUNTRY] should allow more immigrants with a high level of education to come and live here? Do you...

Strongly agree*
Somewhat agree*
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

Q6b: How much do you agree or disagree that [COUNTRY] should allow more immigrants with a low level of education to come and live here? Do you...

Strongly agree*
Somewhat agree*
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

CHART 10

Q7: In deciding which immigrants to admit to [COUNTRY], should the government give preference to immigrants who have a high level of education but no job offer, or should it give preference to immigrants who have a job offer in [COUNTRY] but a lower level of education?

Give preference to immigrants with high level of education even if they don't have a job offer*
Give preference to immigrants with a job offer, even if they don't have a high level of education*

CHART 11

Q8a and Q8b: How important do you think the following attributes are for admitting immigrants with a [SPLIT A: high / SPLIT B: low] level of education to [COUNTRY]?

- 1: They come from a cultural background similar to ours
 - 2: They have skills needed in [COUNTRY]
 - 3: They won't use social benefits
- Very important*
Important
Not very important

CHART 12

Q29: Generally speaking, how well do you think that (SPLIT A: Muslim immigrants / SPLIT B: immigrants) are integrating into [NATIONALITY] society?

Very well*

Well*

Poorly

Very poorly

Q30: And what about the (SPLIT A: Children of Muslim immigrants / SPLIT B: Children of immigrants) who were born in [COUNTRY]? How well do you think they are integrating into [NATIONALITY] society?

Very well*

Well*

Poorly

Very poorly

CHART 13

Q10a: Which of the following attributes do you think is the most important precondition to obtaining [NATIONALITY] citizenship (U.S. ONLY: American citizenship)?

Being able to speak [NATIONAL LANGUAGE(S)]*

Respecting [NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws*

Having lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life*

Sharing [NATIONALITY] cultural values*

CHART 14

Q15a: Thinking about policies designed to reduce illegal immigration that could be adopted in [COUNTRY] at the national level, which one of the following do you think would be the most effective in reducing illegal immigration?

Increasing development aid to poorer countries whose citizens immigrate illegally to [COUNTRY]*

Reinforcing [NATIONALITY] border controls*

Imposing tougher penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants*

Making it easier for immigrants to legally enter [COUNTRY] to work and study*



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

www.transatlantictrends.org

Transatlantic Trends: Immigration is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Compagnia di San Paolo, and the Barrow Cadbury Trust, with additional support from the Fundación BBVA.

